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Workers' Compensation
by H. Michael Bagley*
Daniel C. Kniffen**
and Katherine D. Dixon***
This survey period brought minimal changes in workers' compensation
legislation, but several interesting decisions were issued. Among those
decisions are cases confirming the exclusive remedy provisions of the
Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act"),' a case involving an injury that
occurred when an employee was on a lunch break, and several statute
of limitations cases.
I.

LEGISLATION

Since the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act,2 the
legislature has been discussing whether the Subsequent Injury Trust
Fund ("SITF' provides any benefits worth the costs assessed against
insurers and businesses. Without a great deal of fanfare, the legislature
passed a bill providing that the SITF shall cease accepting claims for
injuries occurring on or prior to June 30, 2008. 4 Meanwhile, insurers
and self-insurers will continue to pay assessments to the SITF to pay for
existing claims.5 Although the current change in the law calls for the
demise of the SITF, a possibility exists that a different course may be

* Partner in the firm of Drew, Eckl & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory
University (B.A., 1977); University of Georgia (J.D., 1980). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Partner in the firm of Drew, Eckl & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer
University (B.A., 1981; J.D., cum laude, 1984). Member, Mercer Law Review (1982-1984);
Editor in Chief (1983-1984). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Partner in the firm of Drew, Eckl & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory
University (BA., 1983); University of Georgia (J.D., cum laude, 1990). Member, State Bar
of Georgia.
1. O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-1 to -421 (2004).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
3. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-350 (2004).
4. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-367 (2004).

5. Id.
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taken. The legislature required the SITF to complete an actuarial study
to determine its unfunded liability by January 1, 2005.6 On December
31, 2020, the SITF is discharged of its duties, except to administer any
remaining claims.7
The only other significant legislative change during the survey period
dealt with guardianship. In workers' compensation claims, guardians
are appointed in two situations: if the claimant is a minor child or if the
claimant is legally incapacitated.8 Since the imposition of limitations
on the board's authority to appoint guardians in 1996, the administration of claims involving minors and incompetents has been more
problematic.
The 2004 legislature made two amendments to the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 34-9-2269 concerning the
appointment of guardians in workers' compensation claims.' ° Before
the 2004 amendment, only the probate court of the county in which the
minor child or the incapacitated employee lived could appoint a
guardian." The amendment now provides for the appointment of an
by "a court of competent jurisdiction outside the
appropriate guardian
2
State of Georgia."1
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-226 also provides for the appointment of
temporary guardians in cases settled for less than the statutorily
mandated maximum amount.' 3 The 2004 amendment to the code
section increased this maximum amount from a net settlement of
$25,000 to $50,000.'4
II.

EXCLUSIVE REMEDY DocTRINE

The attack on the exclusive remedy doctrine"8 has continued for
almost two decades, but the doctrine continues to be an area in which
there is clarity and simplicity. One recent decision emphasized that the
boundaries of the exclusive remedy doctrine extend to alleged injuries
that are not compensable under the Act, so long as the injuries are

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.
Id.
O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A.

§ 34-9-85 (2004).
§ 34-9-226 (2004).
§ 34-9-226 (2000), amended by O.C.G.A. § 34-9-226(a) (2004).
§ 34-9-226.
§ 34-9-11 (2004).
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ancillary to a physical occurrence arising out of and in the course of
employment. 6
In Lewis v. Northside Hospital, Inc.,"7 Patricia Lewis and her coworker were engaged in a heated argument regarding the handling of
work-related material when the co-worker either punched or poked
Lewis in the back, which resulted in a battery. Both employees were
terminated. Lewis sued not only the co-worker but her employer as well,
claiming that the employer was liable for negligent retention and
respondeat superior. The trial court granted the employer's motion for
summary judgment based on the exclusive remedy doctrine."8
Lewis appealed, arguing that she suffered mental injuries, which are
not compensable under the Act, and therefore, her civil action regarding
those injuries should not have been barred by the Act's exclusive remedy
provision. Historically, nonphysical mental injuries arising out of a
physical occurrence have fallen within the purview of the Act for
purposes of the exclusive remedy doctrine, while those claims with no
connection to a physical injury have not.'9
In Bryant v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,2 the court of appeals held that
just because "injuries to... peace, happiness, and feelings may not be
compensable under the Act does not take those injuries out of the
purview of the Act."2 The court in Bryant concluded that the nonphysical injuries were barred by the exclusive remedy doctrine, even though
they were not compensable under the Act.22 A contrary result was
reached in Oliver v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,"8 when the injury alleged
was exclusively nonphysical, involving libel, slander, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.24 The court concluded that the claims
were not barred by the Act's exclusive remedy provisions.25
In Lewis, however, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision. 26 Because Lewis was "injured" in a work-related incident
involving a physical battery, no matter how slight, and because her

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Lewis v. Northside Hosp. Inc., 267 Ga. App. 288, 289, 599 S.E.2d 267, 268 (2004).
267 Ga. App. 288, 599 S.E.2d 267 (2004).
Id. at 289, 599 S.E.2d at 268.
Id. at 290, 599 S.E.2d at 269.
203 Ga. App. 770, 417 S.E.2d 688 (1992).
Id. at 772, 417 S.E.2d at 691.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
209 Ga. App. 703, 434 S.E.2d 500 (1993).
Id. at 704, 434 S.E.2d at 500-01.
Id.
Lewis, 267 Ga. App. at 289, 599 S.E.2d at 268.
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claim for nonphysical damages arose out of that battery, the exclusive
remedy provision applied and barred her civil suit."
III.
A.

CASE LAW

Appeal to Superior Court

In Fulton County Board of Education v. Taylor," the issue was
whether the superior court had jurisdiction to remand a case with
directions for the court to answer three questions requiring factual
findings and to change the award as deemed necessary based on the
three answers.' Before the superior court heard the case, the administrative law judge ("ALJ") found the claimant had conducted a diligent
job search, and medical benefits and attorney fees were due. The
appellate division substantially revised the factual findings and partially
reversed the AU.'s award. Thus, both parties appealed to superior
court.3" Being dissatisfied with the superior court's direction, the court
of appeals granted Fulton County Board of Education's appeal.3
Before reaching the substantive matters of the actual case, the court
of appeals had to first determine if it had jurisdiction to hear the
appeal." Because the superior court's order did not explicitly set aside
the appellate division's award, some debate existed concerning whether
the award was appealable.' The court resolved this dilemma by noting
that the superior court's order effectively set aside the appellate division
award and that the superior court did not explicitly retain jurisdiction." Thus, the court of appeals concluded that it did indeed have
jurisdiction over Fulton County Board of Education's appeal."5

27. Id. at 292, 599 S.E.2d at 270.
28. 262 Ga. App. 512, 586 S.E.2d 51 (2003).
29. Id. at 513, 586 S.E.2d at 52.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 513-14, 586 S.E.2d at 52-53.
33. Id. at 514-16, 586 S.E.2d at 53-54.
34. Id. at 514, 586 S.E.2d at 53.
35. Id. O.C.G.A. section 34-9-105(d) states:
No decision of the board shall be set aside by the court upon any grounds other
than one or more of the grounds stated in subsection (c) of this Code section. In
the event a hearing is not held and a decision is not rendered by the superior
court within the time provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, the decision
of the board shall, by operation of law, be affirmed. The date of entry of judgment
for purposes of appeal pursuant to Code [section 5-6-35 of a decision affirmed by
operation of law without action of the superior court shall be the last date on
which the superior court could have taken action under subsection (b) of this Code
section. Upon the setting aside of any such decision of the board, the court may
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Fulton County Board of Education argued that the appellate division's
award was supported by the proper evidentiary standard, and thus,
under the "any evidence" rule, 6 the superior court was not authorized
to set aside those findings by seeking to elicit unnecessary factual
findings that had already been resolved by portions of the award.37
The court of appeals agreed with this argument and determined that
"[t]he superior court erred to the extent that it sought ...

to elicit

additional factual findings on issues that had already been resolved by
the portion[s] of the appellate division award that denied. . . disability
benefits and assessed attorney fees." 3
The court of appeals affirmed the superior court's implicit setting aside
of the portion of the appellate division's award that ordered payment of
certain medical expenses.39 The court concluded that the evidence did
not support the appellate division's stated rationale on the issue of
authorized medical expenses.'4 Thus, although the superior court
ostensibly had the power under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-105(d) 41 to
remand a case "to the board for further hearing or proceedings in
conformity with the judgement and opinion of the court,"42 the court of
appeals pointed out that such remand is clearly limited.43 A remand
by the superior court must be only within the framework of the "any

recommit the controversy to the board for further hearing or proceedings in
conformity with the judgment and opinion of the court; or such court may enter
the proper judgment upon the findings, as the nature of the case may demand.
Such decree of the court shall have the same effect and all proceedings in relation
thereto shall, subject to the other provisions of this chapter, thereafter be the
same as though rendered in an action heard and determined by the court.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(d) (2004).
36. Taylor, 262 Ga. App. at 514, 586 S.E.2d at 53. If there is "any evidence" to
authorize a finding in accordance with the contentions of the prevailing party before the
board, the superior court and court of appeals are bound by this standard in affirming the
award. Jones County Bd. of Educ. v. Patterson, 255 Ga. App. 166, 167, 564 S.E.2d 777, 778
(2002).
37. Taylor, 262 Ga. App. at 514, 586 S.E.2d at 52. The unnecessary factual findings
the board referenced included: when the claimant was temporarily disabled, when he could
perform restricted work, and when he could perform regular duty work. Id. at 515, 586
S.E.2d at 53.
38. Id. at 515, 586 S.E.2d at 54.
39. Id. at 515-16, 586 S.E.2d at 54.
40. Id.
41. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(d).
42. Id.
43. Taylor, 262 Ga. App. at 513, 586 S.E.2d at 53.
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evidence" standard or the five statutory grounds for error" that are
applicable to superior court appeals.4 5
In another case concerning a remand by the superior court, the court
of appeals again addressed the limited basis for remand by the superior
court." In Moffitt Construction,Inc. v.Barnes,47 the claimant injured
his lower back in January 2000. He was paid temporary disability
benefits for his injury. In July 2000 the employer suspended benefits,
alleging that the claimant had experienced an improvement in his
condition. The claimant objected, and a hearing was held. After the
hearing the ALJ issued a decision finding that the employer met its
burden of proving a change in condition for the better and allowed the
suspension of benefits to stand. As part of the award, the AIJ ordered
4
both parties to agree on a new neurosurgeon to evaluate the claimant.
The claimant appealed the AU's decision, and while the appeal was
pending, the parties agreed upon Dr. Franklin Epstein to evaluate the
claimant. The doctor evaluated the claimant on April 10, 2002. The oral
argument on the appeal was heard May 8, 2002. At that argument the
claimant sought to have the appellate division consider the report of Dr.
Epstein. The appellate division denied the claimant's request that Dr.
Epstein's report be considered and affirmed the AU's decision on July
5, 2002. The appellate division did not believe Dr. Epstein's report was
"newly discovered evidence" that it should consider, and therefore, the
court concluded that if the claimant chose to use the report, he could
seek another hearing to allege a change in condition for the worse.49
The superior court determined that the appellate division erred in
refusing to consider Dr. Epstein's report.5 0 The superior court reasoned
that the case should be remanded to the appellate division because the
AIUs decision was largely based on a medical report "'that was

44. O.C.G.A. section 34-9-105(c) states:
The findings made by the members within their powers shall, in the absence of
fraud, be conclusive; but upon such hearing the court shall set aside the decision
if it is found that:
(1) The members acted without or in excess of their powers;
(2) The decision was procured by fraud;
(3) The facts found by the members do not support the decision;
(4) There is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the
members making the decision; or
(5) The decision is contrary to law.
45. Taylor, 262 Ga. App. at 514, 586 S.E.2d at 53.
46. Moffitt Constr., Inc. v. Barnes, 263 Ga. App. 175, 175, 587 S.E.2d 293, 293 (2003).
47. 263 Ga. App. 175, 587 S.E.2d 293 (2003).
48. Id. at 176, 587 S.E.2d at 293.
49. Id., 587 S.E.2d at 294.
50. Id.
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subsequently contradicted completely'" by Dr. Epstein.5 The superior
court issued an order that the appellate division consider Dr. Epstein's
report as "newly discovered evidence" and instructed the appellate
division to redetermine what weight the report of another doctor, Dr.
Goodrich, should be given in determining whether the claimant was
disabled. 2
The employer and insurer appealed to the court of appeals, citing as
error the superior court's remand of the case to consider Dr. Epstein's
report."s The court of appeals agreed, noting if there was "any evidence" to support the board's award, it should be affirmed.' The court
of appeals went on to specifically state that while the superior court had
the power to set aside the board's decision and remand, it could only do
so on five statutory grounds.5" The court determined the alleged newly
discovered evidence was not one of those grounds.5 6
B.

Continuous Employment

Last year we commented on two Georgia Court of Appeals decisions 7
affecting the coverage of the Act for employees, such as law enforcement
personnel, whose scope of employment frequently extends beyond regular
In the most recent survey period, the Georgia
working hours.'
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision in Mayor &
Aldermen of Savannah v. Stevens,5 9 holding that the decision "unjustifiably extend[ed] the scope of a public employer's liability for employee
The claimant,
injuries under established workers' compensation law.'
to work in
while
driving
a
car
accident
injured
in
Stevens,
was
Eunita
her personal car and wearing her police uniform. 6 ' Stevens was off
duty at the time of the accident, but the police department's policy

51. Id.
52. Id. at 176-77, 587 S.E.2d at 294.
53. Id. at 175, 587 S.E.2d at 293.
54. Id. at 176-77, 587 S.E.2d at 294; see supra note 36.
55. Moffitt, 263 Ga. App at 177, 587 S.E.2d at 294; see supra note 44.
56. Moffitt, 263 Ga. App. at 177, 587 S.E.2d at 294.
57. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah v. Stevens, 261 Ga. App. 694, 583 S.E.2d 553
(2003), overruled by Mayor & Alderman of Savannah v. Stevens, 278 Ga. 166, 598 S.E.2d
456 (2004); Harris County Sheriffs Office v. Negrete, 259 Ga. App. 891, 578 S.E.2d 579
(2003).
58. See H. Michael Bagley, et al., Workers' Compensation, 55 MERCER L. REV. 496
(2003).
59. 278 Ga. 166, 598 S.E.2d 456 (2004).
60. Id. at 166, 598 S.E.2d at 457.
61. Id.
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required that she "enforce the law at any time while she was within the
Savannah city limits."6 2
Although the claimant was not actively engaged in any law enforcement activity at the time of her accident, the court of appeals determined that her injuries were covered by the Workers' Compensation Act
because "[tihe uncontradicted testimony demonstrated that Stevens was
on call, in uniform, armed, carrying a radio, and on the city streets that
her job demanded that she protect."' The supreme court reversed,
however, and ruled that the court of appeals failed to apply the wellestablished principle that an injury must not only be "in the course of'
employment, but it must also "arise out of' employment."4
As established in workers' compensation law, the terms "arising out
of' and "in the course of' employment are not synonymous. The
requirement that an injury by accident "arise out of' employment refers
to the causal connection between the circumstances of the work and the
resulting injury.65 In contrast the phrase "in the course of"refers to
the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes
place.66
While noting that Stevens's injury might well have been "in the course
of' her employment, the court determined her injuries from the car
accident did not "arise out of' employment.6 7 The court stated:
Stevens'[s] car accident in this case was in no way related to her work
as a police officer. At the time of the accident, she was not actively
engaged in any police work nor was she responding to a law enforcement problem. The hazards she encountered were in no way occasioned by her job as a police officer. Because there was no causal
connection between her employment and her accident, Stevens'[s]
injuries did not arise out of her employment.'
The court went on to overrule Board of Trustees of the Policemen's
Pension Fund v. Christy,69 in which the court held that an officer who
was injured on a police motorcycle while riding home from work was

62. Id. at 167, 598 S.E.2d at 458.
63. Stevens, 261 Ga. App. 694, 698, 583 S.E.2d 553, 556, overruled by Mayor &
Alderman of Savannah v. Stevens, 278 Ga. 166, 598 S.E.2d 456 (2004).
64. Stevens, 278 Ga. at 168, 598 S.E.2d at 458.
65. Id. at 166-67, 589 S.E.2d at 457-58.
66. Lee v. Middleton Logging Co., 198 Ga. App. 585, 402 S.E.2d 536 (1991); McElreath
v. McElreath, 155 Ga. App. 826, 273 S.E.2d 205 (1980); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v.
Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 118 S.E. 786 (1923).

67. Stevens, 278 Ga. at 167, 598 S.E.2d at 458.
68. Id.
69. 246 Ga. 553, 272 S.E.2d 288 (1980).
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entitled to workers' compensation benefits?0° As it did in Stevens, the
court noted that while the claimant in Christy might well have been in
the course of his employment because he was riding a police motorcycle,
and, therefore, perhaps providing a benefit to the employer, no causal
connection existed between the injuries and Christy's job as a police
officer.7
With regard to off-duty police officers and other similarly situated
employees, the Georgia Supreme Court has now made clear that officers
must be more than merely "on call," or otherwise in a place they might
reasonably be expected to be in the performance of their duties for an
injury to be compensable.72 In addition to being "in the course of"
employment, claimants will have to show that accidents were actually
caused by the performance of work-related activities and did not merely
occur at a time when the claimants might have been called to perform
police work.73
Hernias

C.

In Union City Auto Partsv. Edwards,7 4 the court of appeals revisited
the issue of pre-existing hernias aggravated by an injury arising out of
7
and in the course of employment.75 O.C.G.A. section 34-9-1(4) " was
amended in 1994 to state that an "aggravation of a preexisting condition
by accident arising out of and in the course of employment" is included
within the definition of "injury." " However, the code section dealing
expressly
exclusively with hernias, O.C.G.A. section 34-9-266,'
disallows compensation for the aggravation of any type of pre-existing
hernia.7 9
Jay Edwards developed hernias as a result of surgery performed before
his employment. Then, while in the employ of Union City Auto Parts
("UCAP"), Edwards was injured in an on-the-job automobile accident.
The accident aggravated his hernias.'s

70. Stevens, 278 Ga. at 168, 598 S.E.2d at 458; Christy, 246 Ga. at 556-57, 272 S.E.2d
at 291-92.
71. Stevens, 278 Ga. at 167-68, 598 S.E.2d at 458.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 263 Ga. App. 799, 589 S.E.2d 351 (2003).
75. Id. at 799, 589 S.E.2d at 351.
76. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) (2004).

77. Id.
78.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-266 (2004).

79. Id. See Edwards, 263 Ga. App. at 800-01, 589 S.E.2d at 353.
80. Edwards, 263 Ga. App. at 799, 589 S.E.2d at 352.
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The court of appeals agreed to address whether the aggravation of a
pre-existing hernia required payment of medical expenses under the
Act. 8' No issue regarding the payment of disability benefits existed.82
The court held that O.C.G.A. section 34-9-1(4) codified existing case law
so as to provide for the compensation of injuries that aggravate existing
conditions.' However, these conditions are only compensable "[e]xcept
as otherwise provided."s4 The court held that O.C.G.A. section 34-9-266
provided such an exception with regard to hernias.8 " Because Edwards's hernias existed prior to his work-related accident, the exception
in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-266 applied and barred him from any recovery
of benefits.8 "
D. Late Payment Penalties
Late payment penalties under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-2217 are
assessed at twenty percent of the total settlement, so such cases are
often hotly contested." Because each case is fact-specific, the timeline
of events is always significant. In one such case, Abdul-Hakim v. Mead
School & Office Products,9 the court held that an employer's check
paying a stipulation was timely after reviewing the specific language of
and determining that the check complied with that lanthe stipulation
9
guage

0

81. Id. at 800, 589 S.E.2d at 353.
82. Id. at 799, 589 S.E.2d at 352. Because the case did not involve any issue regarding
the entitlement to disability benefits, the court addressed only in obiter dicta prior
anomolous decisions finding that disability benefits could be awarded based upon the
aggravation of a pre-existing hernia. Id. at 799 n.1, 589 S.E.2d 352 n.1 (citing Boswell v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 77 Ga. App. 556,49 S.E.2d 117 (1948); Mfrs. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Peacock,
97 Ga. App. 26, 101 S.E.2d 898 (1958)).
83. Id. at 801, 589 S.E.2d at 353.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. O.C.G.A § 34-9-221 (2004).
88. Id.
89. 267 Ga. App. 121, 598 S.E.2d 808 (2004).
90. Id. at 124, 598 S.E.2d at 811. Board Rule 15(e) states:
Unless otherwise specified in the attorney fee contract filed with the Board and
in the terms of the stipulation, the proceeds of the approved stipulated settlement
agreement shall be sent directly to the employee or claimant. If an attorney is to
be paid, the stipulation must state the amount of the fee, and itemize all expenses
which should be reimbursed. Expenses and attorney fees shall be paid in a check
payable to the attorney only, and proceeds due to the employee shall be paid in
a check payable to the employee only.
Rules & Regulations of the State Board of Workers' Compensation Rule 15(e) (2004).
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The claimant settled his case for $50,000, and the board approved the
stipulation and agreement on December 18, 2001.91 The agreement
stated that "'settlement will be paid as follows: $12,500.00 to the
Employee's attorney and $37,500.00 to the Employee. All settlement
92
Two
proceeds are to be sent directly to the Employee's attorney.'
of
firm
law
to
the
$37,500
for
check
a
sent
Mead
days after approval,
AbdulJamaal
and
Sweet
F.
"'John
out
to
made
Sweet,
Clements &
Hakim.' 9 3 Some time within the following two weeks, the law firm
returned the check to Mead, claiming it could not negotiate the check as
drafted, and even if it could, Sweet was not available to sign the check.
Mead received this returned check on January 4, 2002 and issued a new
check payable to Abdul-Hakim on January 15, 2002. The attorney fee
portion of the settlement proceeds was never in dispute.'
The law firm notified Mead that, pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 34-95
221(f), it was seeking late payment penalties on the $37,500." The
claimant filed a motion for those fees, based upon the argument that the
check did not comply with the terms of the stipulation, and that the law
firm could not accept the check without incurring "'negative ... tax
consequences."' Mead disagreed and argued that it issued the check
on time, that the check complied with the terms of the settlement
agreement, that it sent the settlement check the same way prior weekly
checks had been issued, and that the alleged negative tax consequences
97
for the law firm had nothing to do with whether the check was timely.
The ALJ agreed that the check complied with the terms of the
settlement agreement and denied the claimant's motion. The claimant
appealed to the appellate division, which affirmed the AL's ruling. The
claimant appealed to the superior court, and again the board's award
was affirmed. The claimant then appealed to the court of appeals, which
accepted the case. 98 The court of appeals reviewed the facts but
ultimately noted that this was an "any evidence" case and affirmed the
superior court.9

91. Abdul-Hakim, 267 Ga. App. at 122, 598 S.E.2d at 810.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 123, 598 S.E.2d at 810.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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New Accident and "Any Evidence" Standard

In a case dealing with the finding of a new accident, the court of
appeals addressed the superior court's attempt to substitute itself as the
In Haralson County v.
fact-finding body in lieu of the board.'
Lee,'' the claimant needed a shoulder replacement, and he alleged
that his condition resulted from working for Haralson County. The
claimant had worked as an appraiser for Haralson County since 1989
and incurred a compensable shoulder injury on June 3, 1993. He was
treated by Dr. Ralph Fleck at the time of the injury and thereafter. He
was terminated on January 11, 1994, for reasons not related to the job
injury but continued to be treated by Dr. Fleck. The claimant then
began working full-time in construction for his own business. The
work, although on
claimant testified that he mostly did supervisory
10 2
bricks.
and
blocks
cinder
laid
he
occasion
On May 3, 1995, Dr. Fleck diagnosed the claimant with arthritis and
prescribed injections. On June 14, 1995, the claimant complained to Dr.
Fleck of recurring pain in his shoulder."°u Dr. Fleck's notes showed
that the claimant "'has still been working building houses.'"' 4 On
January 25, 1996, while the claimant was holding a tool box in his right
hand, he either reached for or lifted a level with his left arm at which
time he experienced excruciating pain in his left shoulder. Dr. Fleck
subsequently recommended a shoulder replacement. On May 14, 2001,
the claimant filed for a hearing seeking payment of medical bills and
requesting that Haralson County pay for the shoulder replacement.
Haralson County controverted the claim, stating that the claimant had
suffered a new accident on January 25, 1996.105
A hearing was held, and Dr. Fleck's testimony was considered. Dr.
Fleck testified that he felt the claimant's construction work aggravated
the shoulder and probably caused it to be more painful. Dr. Fleck also
testified that he did not think the original June 1993 injury was a direct
cause of the need for the shoulder replacement because the claimant
actually had shoulder problems before 1993. However, Dr. Fleck stated
that the June 1993 incident, as well as the January 1996 incident,
aggravated the shoulder."°

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Haralson County v. Lee, 264 Ga. App. 68, 70, 589 S.E.2d 872, 874 (2003).
264 Ga. App. 68, 589 S.E.2d 872 (2003).
Id. at 68-69, 589 S.E.2d at 873.
Id. at 68, 589 S.E.2d at 873.
Id.
Id. at 68-69, 589 S.E.2d at 873-74.
Id. at 69, 589 S.E.2d at 874.

2004]

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

491

Based on Dr. Fleck's testimony and other evidence, the ALJ determined that the claimant sustained a new injury in January 1996, and
that his employment after leaving Haralson County aggravated his preexisting shoulder problem. The ALJ removed future liability from
Haralson County for medical benefits and for the shoulder replacement.' 7 The claimant appealed, but the appellate division affirmed
the award as "'supported by a preponderance of competent and credible
evidence contained [in] the record .... '",108 The superior court,
however, reversed the appellate division, holding that the ALJ improperly impeached the claimant's testimony to find a new accident. The
superior court stated that Dr. Fleck's notes, which stated that the
claimant lifted a level, were contradictory to the claimant's statement
that he reached for a level, and that the AJ should not have concluded
that the claimant's testimony was not credible." 9
The court
The court of appeals reversed the superior court."'
applied the correct "any evidence" standard and expressly stated that
the ALJ did not in fact find any contradiction between the claimant's
testimony and that of Dr. Fleck."' The court of appeals cited the
proper standard of review, noting that the superior court did not have
the authority to substitute itself as the fact-finding body when there was
"at least a scintilla of evidence to support [the board's] finding. ...
Notice of Hearing
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-102(a)1 3 provides that "no hearing [on a
workers' compensation claim] shall be scheduled less than [thirty] days
nor more than [ninety] days from the date of the hearing notice." 4
In High Voltage Vending, L.L.C. v. Odom,"5 the court of appeals held
that effective notice is sufficient to satisfy this code section." 6
On May 4, 2001, Ennis G. Odom was injured when he fell from a
ladder while performing construction work at You're In Luck Coffee
Shop. He filed a notice of claim and a request for hearing on June 7,
2001, listing his employer as Cornetta Enterprises d/b/a High Voltage
Vending, with an address in Macon, Georgia. On September 13, 2001,
F
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Odom filed a request to add You're In Luck Coffee Shop, Cornetta
Enterprises d/b/a Club Exotica, and John Cornetta as parties to the
claim. On September 26, 2001, the court issued an order adding these
parties and notifying the new parties of the October 15, 2001 hearing,
which was less than thirty days from the date of the order adding the
new parties. High Voltage's address was listed as the same Macon
address that appeared on the original notice of claim, and the order sent
to High Voltage was returned as undeliverable." 7
Following a hearing at which High Voltage was not represented, the
ALJ issued an award ordering High Voltage to pay benefits. The ALJ
found that notice of the hearing was adequate because John Cornetta
was president and part owner of High Voltage, and he had been sent a
subpoena to appear at the hearing. In addition the address for High
Voltage was the same as Cornetta Enterprises, and the notice mailed to
Cornetta Enterprises had not been returned. Therefore, High Voltage
had adequate notice of the hearing through its president, John Cornetta.
On appeal the appellate division and superior court affirmed."' The
court of appeals also affirmed based not only upon its agreement with
the underlying decisions but also based upon the apparent fact that High
Voltage failed to maintain a current address with the board in violation
of O.C.G.A. section 34-9-102(i), which barred High Voltage from arguing
that it was denied proper notice." 9
G. Scheduled Break Exception
The scheduled break exception' 20 states that "[glenerally, where an
employee is on a scheduled break and is not conducting her employer's
business, the Workers' Compensation Act does not apply."12' In ATC
Healthcare Service, Inc. v. Adams,2 the court of appeals helped to
define the scheduled break exception and articulated that it is not to be
defined rigidly or narrowly."2
Rita Adams was hired by ATC, a staffing agency, to fill nursing
positions on an "as needed" basis at the Augusta State Medical Prison.
As part of her employment, Adams was sent to a three-day training
class. Each day the class would break around noon for an hour, and the
employees were allowed to leave the prison premises for lunch. If the
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class finished everything scheduled for the morning, the instructor would
occasionally release the class earlier for the lunch hour. 2 4
On the first day of the training program, the instructor released the
class around 11:30 a.m. and told it to return at 1:00 p.m. While at a
Cracker Barrel restaurant with other trainees, Adams slipped and fell,
injuring her right knee. She underwent surgery on the knee two days
later and returned to work three weeks afterwards. She filed a workers'
compensation claim against ATC, seeking weekly indemnity benefits,
medical benefits, and attorney fees. ATC argued that Adams was on a
regularly scheduled lunch break, which precluded compensability under
the Workers' Compensation Act.'2
The ALJ awarded Adams the benefits she sought, finding that she was
not on a regularly scheduled lunch break. 1 26 The appellate division
affirmed the decision, but the court of appeals reversed it, concluding
127
that the board had "construed the lunch break rule too narrowly."

The court of appeals differentiated between the concepts of a "scheduled"
break and an "unscheduled" break, as opposed to making the regularity
of the break controlling, and determined that the lunch break was
scheduled." The court reasoned that although the class was occasionally released early, the schedule for each day included a break for lunch
around the same time, and the breaks could be taken off of the
premises. 1" In addition, the employees were free to use their time in
any way they wished and were not paid during the regular break
time." 0 The court observed, "[u]nder these circumstances, it strains
The court
logic to view the break as anything but scheduled."'
declined to rule on whether an unscheduled lunch break, taken off of the
employer's premises, during which time the employee is free of work
obligations, arises out of the course of employment.3 2
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H. Statute of Limitations
The Georgia Court of Appeals issued three decisions" during the
survey period, all involving the change in condition statute of limitations
found in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104(b).13
The holding in Trent Tube v. Hurston35 underscores that the date
benefits were last actually paid commences the two year statute of
limitations, not the date the employer was entitled to suspend benefits." 6 Hurston was injured on November 3, 1997, and received
workers' compensation benefits. In 1999 Hurston's employer provided
him the opportunity to attempt a return to light-duty work, but Hurston
ceased working after only two days, claiming he was not sufficiently
recovered to perform the job. The employer continued to pay benefits
under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-240137 while waiting for the results of its
appeal. The employer believed that Hurston was no longer entitled to
benefits because he was able to perform the light-duty job. The
employer prevailed before the ALJ and the appellate division of the
State Board of Workers' Compensation. Hurston's benefits were
eventually suspended on May 18, 2000.13

On February 22, 2001, the claimant attempted to return to the lightduty position the employer had offered him in 1999, but the employer
ignored the claimant's written inquiries regarding a return to the job
and terminated the claimant's employment. On March 14, 2001, the
claimant filed a claim for additional disability benefits, claiming an
economic change in condition due to the unavailability of suitable lightduty work. The employer argued that the new claim for disability
benefits was barred by the statute of limitations because it was brought
more than two years after the date the employer was authorized to
suspend benefits, February 17, 1999, which was the date that the AUJ
had previously determined that the claimant was capable of working. 19

The court of appeals affirmed the AJ's determination, as affirmed by
the appellate division and the superior court, that the statute of

133. Trent Tube v. Hurston, 261 Ga. App. 525, 583 S.E.2d 198 (2003); Mechanical
Maint., Inc. v. Yarbrough, 264 Ga. App. 181, 590 S.E.2d 145 (2003); Wet Walls, Inc. v.
Ledezma, 266 Ga. App. 685, 598 S.E.2d 60 (2004).
134. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(b) (2004).
135.
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136. Id. at 525, 583 S.E.2d at 200.
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O.C.G.A. § 34-9-240 (2004).

138. Trent Tube, 261 Ga. App. at 525-26, 583 S.E.2d at 200.
139. Id. at 526, 583 S.E.2d at 200-01.
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limitations did not begin to run until May 18, 2000, which was the last
date income benefits were actually paid. 40 O.C.G.A. section 34-9104(b) provides that the claimant may seek additional disability benefits
based upon a "change in condition," provided that "at the time of
application not more than two years have elapsed since the date the last
Section 34-9-261 or 34-9payment of income benefits pursuant to Code
4
262 was actually made under this chapter."1 1
Although the employer argued that the statute of limitations began to
run on the date the claimant was found capable of performing the
available light-duty work, the court held "[wihat matters now is the last
date benefits were actually paid, not whether the employee turns out to
have been due those benefits. Here, the last payment was indisputably
'actually made' to Hurston on May 18, 2000, less than two years before
he filed his change in condition claim. " 1 42 Although not necessary to
the ruling, the court of appeals also agreed with the AU that late
payment penalties issued by the employer under O.C.G.A. section 34-9221' on March 31, 1999 and April 16, 1999, would also constitute
payments of benefits under the statute of limitations provisions.'
The court stated there was "no reason why these penalty payments
should be separated and treated differently from the income benefits
Even
from which they arose for statute of limitation purposes.""
apart from other benefits paid by the employer, the payment of late
penalties under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-221(e) would have been sufficient
to extend the two year statute of limitations and negate the employer's
statute of limitations defense.
In Mechanical Maintenance, Inc. v. Yarbrough,'" the employer was
more successful with the statute of limitations defense. 41 In this case
the court of appeals emphasized that the payment of permanent partial
disability benefits under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-263' 48 does not affect
the statute of limitations provision in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104(b) with
49
regard to temporary or temporary partial disability benefits.
Yarbrough was injured on September 26, 1995, and received temporary

140. Id., 583 S.E.2d at 201.
141. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(b) (emphasis added).
142. Trent Tube, 261 Ga. App. at 527, 583 S.E.2d at 201.
143. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221 (2004).
144. Trent Tube, 261 Ga. App. at 526-27, 583 S.E.2d at 201.
145. Id. at 528, 583 S.E.2d at 202.
146. 264 Ga. App. 181, 590 S.E.2d 148 (2003).
147. Id. at 184, 590 S.E.2d at 151.
148. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-263 (2004).
149. Yarbrough, 264 Ga. App. at 183, 590 S.E.2d at 150-51.
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total disability ("TTD") benefits from August 8, 1996, through his return
to work on January 1997." S
Although Yarbrough was still under light-duty restrictions from his
treating physician, he returned to his regular duty as a millwright and
continued to perform this job without lost time, until he was laid off on
May 20, 1997. Following Yarbrough's layoff the employer commenced
payment of permanent partial disability ("PPD") benefits under O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-263, in accordance with a permanent disability rating from
the treating physician. These benefits were paid in full on August 30,
1999.151

On March 6, 2000, six months after Yarbrough's PPD benefits had
ceased and more than two years since he had last received TTD benefits,
Yarbrough filed a request for a hearing with the board seeking
additional TTD benefits. On May 30, 2000, he filed a second request for
a hearing with the board, alleging a new injury on May 20, 1997, the
date he had been laid off. Although the ALJ upheld the employer's
statute of limitations
defense, the appellate division reversed, and the
52
employer appealed.
The court of appeals reversed the appellate division, holding that
Yarbrough's change in condition claim for additional TTD benefits was
barred by the two year statute of limitations in O.C.G.A. section 34-9104(b).15 The court of appeals rejected the appellate division and the
superior court's holdings that the payment of PPD benefits to Yarbrough
extended the statute of limitations for the purposes of receiving
temporary total or temporary partial disability benefits."M The court
specifically distinguished the case of Mickens v. Western Probation
Detention Center'55 and determined that this case dealt solely with the
separate statute of limitations for "all issues" cases found in O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-82(a)."5 6 The court reasoned that "Mickens did not involve
construction of O.C.G.A. [section] 34-9-104(b). It interpreted O.C.G.A.
[section] 34-9-82(a), which, as discussed above, requires a new claim for
an injury to be filed within one year after the compensable injury, unless
the employer has paid 'weekly benefits' or provided remedial medical
treatment ....
57

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id. at 181-82, 590 S.E.2d at 149.
Id. at 181, 590 S.E.2d at 149.
Id. at 183-84, 590 S.E.2d at 150-51.
Id.
244 Ga. App. 268, 534 S.E.2d 927 (2000).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82(a) (2004).
Yarbrough, 264 Ga. App. at 183, 590 S.E.2d at 150.

2004]

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

497

Thus, the court of appeals once again emphasized that the initial
question in any statute of limitations case under the Workers' Compensation Act is which statute of limitations applies: the "all issues" statute
in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-82(a), or the "change in condition" statute in
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104(b). 58 As the court previously held, the
"change in condition" statute of limitations applies if the employee has
received any income benefits under the Act. 5 9
Wet Walls, Inc. v. Ledezma 5 ° concerns a bizarre set of circumstances
dealing with the change in condition statute of limitations that was in
effect before significant amendments were made on July 1, 1992.''
Ledezma suffered a severe injury in 1989 while in the employ of Wet
Walls, Inc., fracturing his back and becoming partially paralyzed. When
Ledezma reached maximum medical improvement in 1991, he was given
a PPD rating of 65.5 percent but was still found to be unable to return
to his previous employment as a manual laborer. Ledezma received TTD
benefits, but these were suspended in 1996 when Ledezma was
incarcerated and apparently convicted of being an illegal alien. As a
condition of his parole, Ledezma was deported from the United States on
his release from custody. Notwithstanding his deportation, Ledezma
filed a claim for resumption of TTD benefits and payment of the
outstanding PPD rating."6
The employer raised several defenses, one of which was that the claim
for additional TTD benefits was barred by the two year statute of
limitations in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104(b)."
The court of appeals
noted, however, that the statute of limitations, in effect at the time of
the claimant's 1989 accident, was tolled so long as there were additional
benefits "potentially due" under the Workers' Compensation Act."6
The employer also argued that requiring it to pay workers' compensation benefits to a noncitizen, who was unable to legally work in the
United States, violated a United States Supreme Court decision holding
that the National Labor Relations Board may not award back pay to an
illegal alien."~ Further, the employer argued that it should be allowed

158. Id. at 183-84, 590 S.E.2d at 150-51.
159. See ITT-Thompson Indus. v. Wheeler, 179 Ga. App. 92, 345 S.E.2d 614 (1986);
Clarke v. Samson Mfg. Co., 177 Ga. App. 149, 338 S.E.2d 738 (1985).
160. 266 Ga. App. 685, 598 S.E.2d 60 (2004).
161. Id. at 685, 598 S.E.2d at 60.
162. Id. at 685-86, 598 S.E.2d at 62.
163. Id. at 688, 598 S.E.2d at 64.
164. Id. See generally Holt's Bakery v. Hutchinson, 177 Ga. App. 154, 338 S.E.2d 742
(1985).
165. Ledezma, 266 Ga. App. at 686, 598 S.E.2d at 65 (citing Hoffman Plastics
Compounds, Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 35 U.S. 137 (2002)).
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to cease payment of income benefits to Ledezma because, according to
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,'6 it could not reemploy Ledezma without violating the Act. 167 The court of appeals
rejected these arguments as well because it determined that the
Immigration Reform and Control Act did not preempt Georgia's Workers'
Compensation Act and that the evidence demonstrating Ledezma
remained totally disabled, as opposed to partially disabled, precluded
any argument about his re-employment. 1 8 As a result the employer
remained obligated to pay the claimant TTD benefits, even though he
was precluded from returning to work in the United States. 69
L

Statutory Employment: Employees of Owner-Operators

Under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-1(2),170 commercial trucking owneroperators, defined as those who lease their trucks and drivers to a motor
common carrier, are deemed independent contractors and are not
171
entitled to claim benefits from the carrier for work-related injuries.
The court of appeals in C. Brown Trucking, Inc. v. Rushing 172 clarified
that73the exclusion does not apply to employees of the owner-operator.1
Brown Trucking hired Carlos Garza, an independent owner-operator,
to help fulfill contract requirements with a railway. Garza, in turn,
hired Harold L. Rushing. Rushing was injured when a train hit the
truck he was driving. Because Garza was uninsured, Rushing filed a
claim against Brown Trucking. The AUJ found that Brown Trucking
was Rushing's statutory employer because, at the time he was injured,
Rushing was doing work required to satisfy the contract between Brown
Trucking and the railway and because Garza was Brown Trucking's
subcontractor. 174
On appeal to the superior court, the board's award was affirmed by
operation of law.175 The court of appeals accepted the discretionary
appeal and examined the statute to ascertain whether the legislature
intended to apply the owner-operator exclusion to the employees of
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owner-operators. 176 Applying the principle of statutory construction
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the court noted that while the Act
named a plethora of workers in the same code section as the owneroperator exclusion, there was no mention of owner-operators' employees.' 77

Thus, the court determined that "[t]he omission of any such

reference from the Code subsection must be regarded as deliberate."'
The court of appeals affirmed the ruling and held that an employee of
79
an owner-operator may recover benefits from the statutory employer.
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